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ABSTRACT
In order to further the objective of the patent system and maximize the public's incentive
to innovate, it is imperative that the patent laws maintain a balance between the
interests of patent owners in excluding others from their patents and the interests of
society in the continual progress of technology. The current law in willful infringement
analysis upsets this balance with the affirmative duty of due care, which shifts the
burden of proof in patent infringement suits from the plaintiff to the alleged infringer.
The affirmative duty places a heavy burden on the public and is inconsistent with various
common law concepts. This comment proposes, as a remedy to these current inefficiencies
in the patent law, to remove the affirmative duty from willful infringement analysis.
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ANALYSES
KEVIN J. KELLY*

INTRODUCTION

"[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." -Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr.1
For the past twenty years, the placement of an undue burden on alleged patent
infringers has resulted in a chilling effect on the free trade of ideas that our patent
system contemplates and that is essential to the advancement of innovation in our
society. 2 Our patent system encourages innovation by rewarding inventors with a
limited monopoly 3 in exchange for their disclosure of a new idea to the public. 4 Once
this new information is available, inventors have the incentive to research it and
attempt to design around the patent.5 This process of building upon the ideas of
6
others is threatened by a justified fear of liability.

* J.D. Candidate I.P., May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Civil and Environmental
Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, December 2002. The author would like to
thank his family and friends for their constant support. In addition, the author would like to give a
special thank you to his editor Natosha Cuyler-Sherman for all of her insight, encouragement and
assistance, as well as Larry Kasoff and the entire RIPL editorial board for their editorial assistance.
The author also encourages
and welcomes comments and questions via email at
5kellyke@stu.jmls.edu, or at kevinkelly@illinoisalumni.org.
I Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
2 See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY, A REPORT BY THE FTC Executive Summary, 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter TO PROMOTE INNOVATION]; id.at ch. 5,
29.
3 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). This limited monopoly gives to the patent owner:
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process .... the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing
into the United States, products made by that process.
Id. This limited monopoly lasts for "20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
was filed." Id. § 154(a)(2).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5 Timothy E. DeMasi & John D. Garretson, Perspective: Wilful Patent Infringement Law
Needs Reform, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 2003, at S5.

(3Id.
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Current law holds that once an inventor has actual notice 7 of another's patent
rights, the inventor must conform his conduct to an affirmative duty of due care. The
affirmative duty requires the inventor to determine whether he is infringing before
he may safely proceed with the process of invention.8 In patent infringement suits, a
mere failure of the inventor to prove that he exercised due care to determine whether
or not his conduct constituted infringement may result in a finding of willful
infringement. 9 A patent owner will almost always take advantage of this inequitable
rule by accusing willful infringement. 10 Such a willful infringer may be held liable
for damages up to three times the amount necessary to compensate the patent owner
for his loss.11
Until recently, in order to satisfy the standard of due care, an inventor was
required to obtain the advice or opinion of counsel, typically in the form of a signed
letter discounting any possible infringement. 12 A major problem with the affirmative
duty was the "adverse inference" rule, which forced an alleged infringer to waive the
attorney-client privilege and disclose the legal advice obtained in order to disprove
liability.1 3 The rule allowed a jury to infer willful infringement where the alleged
7 It is uncertain exactly what constitutes actual notice, but generally a "cease and desist" letter
is treated as sufficient evidence of actual notice. See Domestic Fabrics Corp. v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (E.D.N.C. 2004) (discussing actual notice, the court referred to two
cease and desist letters, delivered in December 1998 and February 1999, that informed the
defendant of his infringing behavior).
8 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("Where, as here a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing." In this case, the
defendant Morrison-Knudsen ("M-K") did not obtain legal advice or investigate patent file histories
until long after infringement began. Id. at 1390. When M-K did seek advice, it did so from its own
in-house counsel who was not a patent attorney. Id. Although this by itself does not demonstrate a
lack of good-faith, it is a factor that the court considered. Id. The court held that the defendant
knew or should have known that it continued in its conduct without having legal advice upon which
it could have justifiably relied. Id.).
9 See, e.g., Milgo Elecs. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th
Cir. 1980) (upholding a judgment of willful infringement and holding that once the defendant was
put on notice of the plaintiffs patent rights he was under a duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he was infringing the plaintiffs patents).
10 See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful PatentInfringement, 15 FED. CIR.
B.J. 227, 230, 232 (2004) (studying 1,717 patent cases terminated in 1999-2000, and finding that
willfulness was alleged in 92.3% of the cases).
11 35 U.S.C. § 284,
2 (2000) (giving the courts discretion to treble damages); see Beatrice
Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that a district court's decision to increase damages must be based on a finding of willful
infringement or bad-faith).
12 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. The law as stated in UnderwaterDevices, requiring
disclosure of legal advice in order to satisfy the duty of care, has been the general rule, until the
Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse Fur Nutzfahrzeuge GmhH v. Dana Corp. eliminated the
adverse-inference rule. 383 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
13 Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(discussing the general rule that if an alleged infringer invokes the attorney-client privilege the
court or trier of fact is free to infer that no opinion was obtained, or that if one was obtained, that it
was contrary to the defendant's position). The main problem is the threat to confidentiality of
attorney-client communications. See Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and
Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 86 (2001). The
attorney-client privilege is designed "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients." Id. If confidentiality between attorney and client cannot be guaranteed, clients
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infringer invoked the attorney-client privilege and refused to reveal the advice in
14
order to protect perhaps unrelated confidential information from disclosure.
The en banc decision of Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp.15 ("Knorr-Bremse) reversed some of this precedent that has been inhibiting
the free trade of ideas in our society. 16 Specifically, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") in Knorr-Bremse effectively eliminated the
notorious adverse inference rule.17 In addition to finally returning sanctity to the
attorney-client privilege in the patent infringement context, Knorr-Bremse also
lightened the burden imposed upon alleged infringers.18 However, despite these
might be more cautious than candid when communicating with their lawyers. Id. at 87. A client
who discloses an opinion letter at trial is typically considered to have waived the privilege. -d. This
waiver extends to any and all information and documents the client is in possession of relating to
the advice rendered. Id. Sometimes the waiver may even extend to discovery of the attorney's
work-product, which is normally protected under work-product privilege, a concept meant to protect
a lawyer's work from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties in litigation. Id. at 89-91.
14 See Kloster Speedsteel AB, Inc. v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(emphasizing that when the alleged infringer relies on the attorney-client privilege and remains
silent, this silence will warrant the conclusion that he either obtained no legal advice at all or that
the advice he received indicated that his conduct constituted infringement).
15 Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
This case involved the plaintiff Knorr-Bremse, the patent owner of a certain disc brake, and the
defendants Dana, an American Corporation who collaborated with Haldex, a Swedish Company. Id.
at 1341. The defendants sold, in the United States, the infringing disk brake manufactured by
Haldex. Id. Knorr-Bremse sent a letter to Dana to notify it of infringement litigation against
Haldex in Europe. Id. Before and after the judgment against Haldex, Dana continued to operate
trucks in the U.S. containing the infringing disc brake. Id. at 1342. Knorr-Bremse brought suit
against both Dana and Haldex. Id. at 1341. Haldex claimed that it had consulted counsel in both
the United States and Europe, but asserted the attorney-client privilege and declined to produce any
legal opinion or disclose any advice received. Id. at 1342. The Federal Circuit granted a sua sponte
en banc hearing in order to reconsider precedent regarding the adverse inference rule and willful
infringement. Id. at 1341.
16 Id. The Federal Circuit's en bane decision answered the following questions: "When the
attorney-client privilege and/or work product privilege is invoked by a defendant in an infringement
suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful
infringement?" [Held "No."]. [d. at 1344. "When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it
appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?" [Held "No.")]. Id.at
1345. "Ifthe court concludes that the law should be changed, and the adverse inference withdrawn
as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this case?" [The court determined that the
elimination of the adverse inference rule caused a material change in the totality of the
circumstances, and that the case should be remanded for a reweighing of the evidence to determine
whether the defendant's infringement was willful].
Id. at 1346. "Should the existence of a
substantial defense to infringement be sufficient to defeat liability for willful infringement even if no
legal advice has been secured?" [Held "No."]. Id. at 1347.
17 Id. at 1341.
18See id. The removal of the adverse inference rule will alleviate some problems; in particular,
the alleged infringer will no longer be faced with the "Hobson's choice of either waiving its attorney
client communications or confronting an adverse inference instruction on the issue of willfulness.

See The Use of Exculpatory Opinions in Defending Against a Charge of Willful Infringement McDermott Will & Emery, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Oct. 15, 2004, Intellectual Property, Legislation
& Regulation, Consultancy, at 1 [hereinafter Exculpatory Opinions]. Many inventors, however, may
still feel the need to invest in patent opinions because of fear that without an opinion of counsel it
could be difficult for inventors to prove their adherence to the duty of care. See Lynda L. Calderone,
Opiion ofAdverse Inference Changingin Patent Cases, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia),
Sept. 29, 2004, at 5 (2004).
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attempts, the Federal Circuit stopped short of eliminating the affirmative duty. 19
The Federal Circuit accordingly failed to calibrate the balance between the rights of a
patentee and the ideology of free market competition that fosters innovation in our
20
society.
In order to restore that balance, it is necessary to eliminate the affirmative duty.
The duty, which is contrary to centuries of judicial precedent that places the burden
of proof on the plaintiff, unjustly shifts the burden from the plaintiff to the alleged
infringer.2 1 The affirmative duty allows the patentee to prove notice of the patent,
allege willful infringement, and wait while the alleged infringer fumbles with the
22
inherently difficult task of proving one's own mental state.
In the process of sweeping out the adverse inference rule, the Knorr-Bremse
decision has stirred up a cloud of dust surrounding the issues of affirmative duty and
willfulness.23 Several questions are unanswered and confusion remains as to what
the affirmative duty demands. 24 For example, what constitutes actual notice? Is an
inventor put on notice simply by learning of another's patent, or must he receive a
25
letter from the patentee stating that his conduct may constitute infringement?
What action satisfies due care in the absence of an opinion from counsel? Will the
absence of an opinion from counsel be considered as a factor in determining willful
infringement? 26 Rather than attempt to answer these questions, this comment seeks
to settle the dust and eliminate the affirmative duty altogether.
KnOrr-Brmse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Dyk concurred with the majority regarding the removal of the adverse inference rule,
however he wrote a strong dissent proposing to eliminate the affirmative duty of care. Id," see also,
TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supranote 2, ch. 1, at 1. The report discusses the proper balance between
patent policy and free market competition. Id. at 2. Policy that overly favors free market
competition will inhibit the incentive to patent inventions, whereas policy too much in favor of
patent rights may cause fear of liability inhibiting free market competition. Id. at 2. A proper
balance between these factors is essential. Id.
21 See Knor-Bi-remse, 383 F.3d at 1349 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposalto Shore up the FoundationsofPatentLaw
that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721, 729 (1998).
22 Soo Taylor, suprn note 21, at 748 (discussing that willfulness applies to the infringer's state
of mind).
23 See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
his dissent, Judge Dyk stated, "I do not join the majority opinion to the extent that it may be read as
reaffirming that 'where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he
has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."' Id. The
majority opinion, while upholding the affirmative duty, made no attempt to clear up any of the
uncertainties surrounding the duty of care. See Calderone, supranote 18, at 5 (2004).
24 See Knorr-Bremse,383 F.3d at 1345. The Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse makes clear that
where a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent, he has an affirmative duty to
exercise due care. Id. The court offers no insight, however, as to what constitutes actual notice, or
what might satisfy due care. See id.
25 It is at least clear that a cease and desist letter will serve to satisfy the requirement of actual
notice. See Domestic Fabrics Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (E.D.N.C.
2004).
26 The answer to this question is most likely yes. See Knorr"B±remse, 383 F.3d at 1344, 1345.
The court in Knorr-Bremse held that, where the alleged infringer either lacks an opinion of counsel
or invokes the attorney-client privilege, the jury can no longer draw an adverse inference that such
opinion would have been unfavorable. Id. This does not prevent a jury from considering the fact
that the failure to obtain an opinion of counsel may suggest a failure to act with care. See
19
20
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The background section of this comment will discuss willful infringement and its
relationship to enhancement of damages. The background will also show what the
law requires for a finding of willful infringement and, hence, for an award of
enhanced damages.
Furthermore, the background section will discuss the
progression of the affirmative duty over the past twenty years.
The analysis section of this comment is divided into four subsections describing
four different reasons why the affirmative duty is undesirable in patent litigation.
The first subsection of the analysis will demonstrate that the affirmative duty places
heavy economic costs and unreasonable burdens on society and that the need to
remove these burdens far outweighs the stated rationale for deterring willful and
wanton conduct in patent infringement.2 7 The second subsection will demonstrate
that the duty is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding punitive
damages and runs contrary to ideals of due process.28 This subsection will also show
that an alleged infringer's failure to act with due care closely resembles common law
negligence, a finding of which does not warrant an award of punitive damages. 29 The
third subsection will show that the affirmative duty fails to satisfy common law
requirements for imposition of a duty. In particular, this subsection will analyze the
considerations that are taken into account when imposing a duty of care in common
law negligence cases and show that the affirmative duty as applied to willful
infringement does not comport with these negligence considerations. In the final
subsection of the analysis, this comment will establish that what the duty purports to
achieve can be accomplished in its absence 30 and, therefore, the best possible solution
3 1
is to eliminate the affirmative duty in patent infringement cases entirely.

I. BACKGROUND

This section of the comment will give the reader a better understanding of the
willfulness doctrine in patent infringement suits and how the doctrine relates to a
court's ability to grant an award of enhanced damages. This section will also discuss
the fact that enhanced damages, which can be awarded under the current law for a
failure to act with due care, have previously only been awarded for punitive
Calderone, supra note 18, at 5 (2004).
With Markman v. Wostview clarifying that claim
construction is a question of law, a patent owner may soundly argue that an alleged infringer cannot
meet his duty of care unless he consults with counsel to have the claims of the patent analyzed as a
matter of law to determine if he is infringing. Id.; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
27 See To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 1; see also Powers,
supra note 13, at 100-02.
28 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1349 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
duty of care requirement finds no support in the patent damages statute, the legislative history, or
Supreme Court opinions.").
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979).
30 See Powers, supra note 13, at 100-02.
31 In his dissent in Knorr-Bremse, Judge Dyk concluded, "I would recognize that the due care
requirement is a relic of the past and eliminate it as a factor in the willfulness and enhancement
analysis." Knorr"Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1352 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Dyk realizes that the affirmative duty tilts the scales in favor of the patent owner, and lays
too heavy a burden on alleged infringers; see id. at 1349.
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purposes. This section will also show how the affirmative duty has developed over
the past twenty years and that the duty now threatens the purpose of the patent
system: to further innovation.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[tio promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."3 2 The
language of the Constitution demonstrates a contractual relationship with the
granting of patent rights to an inventor in exchange for the benefit society derives
through public disclosure of the new and useful information.33 The essential quid pro
quo arrangement strikes a balance between protection of patent rights and the
advancement of innovation through free market competition.3 4 The primary objective
of the patent system, however, is to benefit the public, and any reward to the
35
inventor is merely a means of achieving that objective.
The objective of the patent system in furthering innovation is threatened by the
capricious application of willfulness in patent infringement cases. 36 The term
"willful" in the patent infringement context was introduced to define the level of
culpability required for an award of enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C § 284. 3 7 The
statute says that:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the client damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.

32

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

8, cl. 8.

33To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 2.
'3

Id. at Executive Summary, 1. The report begins by discussing the benefits of innovation to

society:
Technological breakthroughs such as automobiles, airplanes, the personal
computer, the Internet, television, telephones, and modern pharmaceuticals
illustrate the power of innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality
of our lives... Both competition and patent policy can foster innovation, but each
requires a proper balance with the other to do so.

Id.
3 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) ("The promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means
to that end.").
36

Seo Margaret E. M. Utterback, Substitute This! A Now Twist on Lost ProfitDamages in

Patent Infringement Suits: Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 2000 WiS. L.
REV. 909, 936 (2000) (emphasizing the severity of willful infringement because of the courts'
discretionary ability to treble damages). Because the affirmative duty places a heavy burden on the
alleged infringer and requires little proof from the patent owner, it is too easy for the patent owner
to allege and succeed in a claim for willful infringement. This advantage of the patent owner in
combination with the courts' discretionary ability to enhance damages creates unpredictable results.
See Taylor, supra note 21, at 725-26.
37 Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that willful infringement liability depends upon considerations of culpability, intent, and state of
mind); see also Sesonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that
although 35 U.S.C. § 284 does not mention under what circumstances the court may enhance
damages, it is settled that a decision to enhance damages must be based on a finding of willful
infringement).
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When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed. Increased damages under this paragraph shall
not apply to provisional rights under section 154(d) of this title.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination
of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the
38
circumstances.
This statute makes no reference to willful infringement, but gives the court the
discretion to increase damages in certain situations. 39 The law of patent infringement
has developed to require a finding of willfulness in order for the court to enhance
damages. 40 In fact, until 1983, it was the general rule that in order for a plaintiff to
obtain an award of enhanced damages, he was required to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant deliberately and willfully copied the patented
invention.41 Under the general rule prior to 1983, the burden of proof was clearly on
the plaintiff.4 2 Now the burden has shifted to the defendant, 43 and willfulness is
decided based on the "totality of the circumstances." 44
The "totality of the
circumstances" is a concept which takes into account factors such as the conduct,
intent, and adherence to the duty of care of the alleged infringer, as well as whether
45
or not the alleged infringer had actual notice of the patentee's rights.
38 35

U.S.C. § 284 (2000).

Id. ("In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.").
40 Sesonies, 81 F.3d at 1574.
41 See Powers, supra note 13, at 69-70. Through analyzing the history of the development of
patent infringement, the author discusses how prior to 1983 a plaintiff was required to show clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously and deliberately infringed on the plaintiffs
patent rights. Id.
42 Id.
The plaintiff had the burden to come forth with "clear and convincing" evidence to prove
damage and causation. Id.
43 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 725-26 (where willfulness is alleged "we shift the burden of
proof to the infringer. We expect the [alleged] willful infringer to prove innocence instead of having
the patent owner prove guilt."). The affirmative duty in patent infringement seems to require much
more proof from the defendant to demonstrate that he acted with due care than it requires proof
from the plaintiff to show that the defendant did not. Id. It can probably be argued that no one is in
a better position to prove the defendant's mental state than the defendant himself; however this is
an unconvincing argument and does not justify shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. In a
criminal case, the defendant may often be in the best position to prove his own mental state, yet he
is afforded the presumption that he is innocent until proven guilty. The affirmative duty runs
contrary to this essential ideal of our adversarial system.
44 See Exculpatory Opinions, supra note 18, at 1. In deciding whether an infringer's conduct
constitutes bad faith, a court must take into consideration the "totality of the circumstances." Id.
45 Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (stating that "[d]etermination of willfulness is made on consideration of the totality of the
circumstances."); see Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992), which lists nine
factors for consideration in finding willfulness:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another;
(2) whether the infringer, when he new of the other's patent protection,
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was
invalid or that it was not infringed;
(3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation...
39
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Because of the relationship between willfulness and enhanced damages, it is
clear that the circumstances that justify a finding of willful infringement should
coincide with those circumstances deemed appropriate for enhancement of damages
under the common law. 46 The common law traditionally refers to enhanced damages
as punitive. 47 The purpose of an award in punitive damages is to punish unlawful
conduct and to deter its repetition. 48 Numerous Supreme Court decisions have held
that punitive damages should only be awarded in situations where conduct is
egregious or reprehensible. 49 In the last twenty years, however, the courts'
application of the willfulness doctrine in patent infringement has strayed from the
50
traditional application of enhanced damages for vindictive and punitive purposes.
In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established in
order to obtain greater uniformity in judicial decisions for patent law cases. 51 Around
(4) Defendant's size and financial condition.
(5) Closeness of the case.
(6) Duration of defendant's misconduct.
(7) Remedial action by the defendant.
(8) Defendant's motivation for harm.
(9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
46 See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[E]nhanced
damages are punitive, not compensatory. Enhancement is not a substitute for perceived
inadequacies in the calculation of actual damages, but depends on a showing of willful infringement
or other indicium of bad faith warranting punitive damages."). In other words, in patent law cases,
a finding of willfulness is required before damages can be enhanced. Id. At common law, egregious
and reprehensible conduct is required before damages are enhanced. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). The logical rule resulting should be that a finding of willfulness must
comport with the common law requirement of egregious and reprehensible conduct. Knorr-Bremse,
383 F.3d at 1351 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47Sensonics, 81 F.3d at 1574; Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing
Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
48 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) ("[P]unitive damages
serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution."); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575
("Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.").
49See, e.g., Campbell 538 U.S. at 416; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
50Powers, supra note 13, at 55; DeMasi, supra note 5, at 5. For over one hundred years, courts
traditionally awarded enhanced damages only in situations were the infringer deliberately copied or
misappropriated the plaintiffs patents. Id. In the past twenty years, however, courts have awarded
enhanced damages against individuals who independently develop their own technology. !-d.;
see
also Taylor, supra note 21, at 729-30 ("Prior to the Underwaterdecision, courts referred to the need
for an honest doubt as to patent validity or infringement.").
51Powers, supra note 13, at 77. The intent of Congress in creating the Federal Circuit was to
make patent rights more predictable and stable by having a centralized court of appeals, and also to
eliminate forum-shopping. Id.; see also Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court stated that one foundation of the formation of the
Federal Circuit court was to reinforce the duty of inventors to act in accordance with the law. Id.
The court further recognized that this was important because the Federal Circuit was developed "at
a time when widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovation
incentive." Id. Although this may seem to be a good intention for enforcing the affirmative duty, the
court fails to realize that the duty, which loosens the requirements for a finding of willfulness, is
having the same negative effect on innovation incentive as was the widespread disregard for patent
rights. See id.
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this same time, several Federal Circuit decisions set a trend of interpreting the law
on willful infringement in a fashion that would tip the balance in favor of the patent
owner. 52 Willful infringement liability was severely altered as the affirmative duty
53
and adverse inference rule crept into the law.

Beginning with Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.54
(" Underwatei) in 1983, the Federal Circuit, in determining whether the defendant
had willfully infringed, ruled that
[w]here ...a potential infinger has actual notice of another's patent
rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether
or not he is infringing ...
[which includes] the duty to seek and obtain
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible
infringing activity.

55

Following this decision were Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc.56 in 1986
and Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co. 57 in 1988. Both of these decisions
applied the adverse inference rule holding that, where an alleged infringer invokes
the attorney-client privilege and refuses to produce advice of counsel, the jury would
58
be permitted to draw an inference of willful infringement.
When Underwater established the affirmative duty to obtain legal advice, it
relied on Milgo Electronics v. United Business Comm unications,59 which was the first
decision to hold that once a potential infringer receives notice of a patent he must
exercise due care to avoid infringement. 60 With the emergence of the adverse

52 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 724. This trend is evidenced by a number of cases. Cent. Soya
Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Although this case was prior to
the "adverse inference" rule, it considered whether or not advice of counsel was obtained in
determining willfulness and found that Hormel did not rely on the opinion of counsel to form a
good-faith belief of non-infringement); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Ownes Ford Co., 758 F.2d
613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (first case suggesting a negative inference rule, set the stage for the
adverse inference rule); Kloster Speedsteel AB, Inc. v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (further developing the negative inference rule); Fromson v.Western Litho Plate & Supply
Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Fromson further developed and reinforced the new
precedent of the adverse inference rule); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (listing factors to consider in "totality of circumstances" regarding willfulness).
53Powers, supra note 13, at 76. Over the years the affirmative duty rule has "crept its way
into the law." Id. The first court to use language suggesting an affirmative duty was the 9th
Circuit. See Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959).
, Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
55 Id. at 1389-90.
56 Kloster Speedsteel AB, Inc. v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
5 Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
5S KlosterSpeedsteel,793 F.2d at 1580; Fromson,853 F.2d at 1572-73.
59 Milgo Elecs. v. United Bus. Communications, 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980). In this case, it
was clearly shown that the defendant deliberately and purposefully copied the patent owner's
modem design. Id. at 666. The court held that '[o]nce UBC had actual notice of Milgo's patent
rights, UBC was under an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not it was
infringing." Id.
6o Id. To go even further back, the first decision to "suggest" the existence of a duty to act with
due care was Coleman Co. v.Holly Mfg. Co. in 1959. 259 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959). After
holding that the defendant's infringement was deliberate and willful, the court went on to state in
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inference rule and the affirmative duty, claims of willfulness have become standard
in virtually all patent infringement lawsuits.61 Many believe that the courts' policies
regarding willful infringement have tipped the balance too far in favor of patent
owners. 62 Regardless, the courts have consistently applied the affirmative duty and
63
adverse inference rule.
The Federal Circuit has finally given some credence to the unanimous
dissatisfaction of the willfulness doctrine by its recent sua sponte grant of rehearing
en banc and decision in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corporation.64 In considering the
65
issues, the court accepted briefs that were filed by twenty-four amici curiae.
Virtually all of the twenty-four briefs requested that the court completely eliminate
the adverse inference allowed to the jury when a party fails to produce an opinion of
66
counsel or invokes the attorney-client privilege and refuses to produce an opinion.
Two of the briefs argued that the affirmative duty of care should be eliminated
altogether. 67 A third brief advocated for a less stringent application of the duty and
suggested that the existence of a duty should depend on the degree or quality of

dicta that the "defendant did not exercise due care to ascertain whether or not it was infringing
plaintiffs patent." Id.; Powers, supra note 13, at 71-72.
61 Se Moore, supra note 10, at 232 (Professor Kimberly Moore's study showed that willful
infringement was alleged in 92.3% of patent cases terminated between 1999-2000).
62 Mark J. Thronson & Richard LaCava, Seeking Balance in Willfullness Doctrine, N. Y. L. J.,
Jan. 26, 2004, at S1.
63 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 724 (" [T]he Federal Circuit decided Underwaterin 1983 and
started down a path toward severely penalizing knowing infringement ... ").
64 See Nicholas M. Cannella et al., Knorr-Bremse: The Demise of the Adverse Inference Rule in
Evaluating Willful Infringement, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, May 2004, at 24.
An en banc panel of the Federal Circuit recently heard oral argument in
KnorrBremse Systeme FuerNutzfahnrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., a case that has
the potential to alter over 20 years of legal precedent on the issue of willful patent
infringement. By sua sponte taking the case en banc, the Federal Circuit signaled
its recognition of the significance of the issue ....
Id.
6 For reference, a list of the amicus curiae briefs filed in Knorr-Bremse is available at
http://www.ssjr.com/amicusbriefs.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
66 Cannella, supra note 64, at 25.
The defendants and virtually all amici urged the Federal Circuit to do away with
the adverse inference when a party refuses to produce an opinion of counsel on the
basis of the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity, and also argued
that the adverse inference should be eliminated when a defendant did not obtain
legal advice at all.
Id.; see also http://www.ssjr.com/amicusbriefs.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) for direct access to these
amicus briefs.
67 Cannella, supra note 64, at 26 ("Two amici advocated for the elimination of the affirmative
duty of care altogether. They argued that patent law in certain fields, such as biotechnology and
business methods, is too unpredictable and evolving for the duty to be reasonably applied."); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization at 5, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 01-1357) [hereinafter
Amicus BriefBiotech]; Amicus Curiae Brief of Securities Industry Association at 11, Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 01-1357)
[hereinafter Amicus BriefSecurities].
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notice that an individual has of another's patent rights. 68 The court removed the
69
adverse inference rule, but upheld a duty of care.
As a result of the affirmative duty of due care, courts have awarded enhanced
damages against infringers who, in fact, did not rely on other patents in developing
their own technology.70 However, an individual who did not rely on another's patent
could not have purposefully and deliberately misappropriated any patent rights.7 1 A
potential infringer's failure to engage in due care does not by itself constitute
reprehensible conduct.7 2 Infringement cases are frequently tried by juries whose
decisions on such technical matters could easily be swayed by suggestions of willful
behavior.7 3 Although such a finding requires consideration of the "totality of the
circumstances," it seems clear that the most convincing factor of willfulness in the
minds of the jury is the alleged infringer's failure to satisfy the affirmative duty of
74
due care.
Although Knorr-Bremse has provided a temporary and partial solution to a
complex problem, there is more to be done. 75 Individual and corporate inventors are

68 Cannella, supra note 64, at 26 ('A third amicus urged that the affirmative duty of care
should not be applied rigidly, but rather should depend on the quality of the patentee's notice of
infringement."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge at 1, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 01-1357) [hereinafter
Amieus BiefPuhlid].
69 Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
70 DeMasi, supra note 5, at 1 ("In the past 20 years, however, courts have provided for
enhanced damages against infringers who independently develop their own technology.").
71 Awarding enhanced damages against an individual who did not deliberately or purposefully
copy or misappropriate another's idea is not only unjust, but runs contrary to common law
jurisprudence requiring proof of egregious conduct before awarding punitive damages.
See
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1351 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72Id. at 1349 (Judge Dyk dissenting) ("b]ut a potential infringer's mere failure to engage in
due care is not itself reprehensible conduct").
73 Justin Beck, The Willful Infringement Mess, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), July 16, 2003,
at 2.

It is no surprise that studies have shown that juries are far more likely than
judges to find willful infringement. But even if there were no difference in how
judges and juries perceive the evidence, willful infringement gives the plaintiff a
legitimate reason to focus on the defendant's 'bad' state of mind, an appealing
prospect given the usual tedium inherent in patent cases.
Id.
71 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1349 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Judge Dyk's dissent, he stated
While the duty of care is only one factor in the determination of enhanced
damages, no one can seriously doubt that, both in the minds of the jurors (in
determining willfulness) and in the decision of the district court (concerning
enhancement), the duty of care is by far the preeminent factor in the vast majority
of cases.
Id.
7,See id. at 1347. The majority opinion holding was that "[a]n adverse inference that a legal
opinion was or would have been unfavorable shall not be drawn from invocation of the
attorney-client and/or work product privileges or from failure to consult with counsel." Id. As stated
before, this is a positive improvement, but the opinion fell short of making the most necessary
remedy by eliminating the affirmative duty. See id.
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faced with the constant threat of liability.7 6 The affirmative duty will force inventors
to devote precious time and resources toward defensive policies to make sure they are
constantly living up to the newly ambiguous standard of care. 7 7 Fear of liability will
deter inventors from designing around existing patents.7 8 In fact, inventors will have
incentive to keep their distance from existing patents in order to avoid receiving
"actual notice," a vague concept that initiates the duty to act with due care.79 This
result is directly contrary to the ultimate goal of patent policy in the United States to foster innovation and further the growth of technology.8 0 In order to maximize the
accomplishment of this goal, it is necessary to eliminate the affirmative duty of care
in patent infringement.

II.

ANALYSIS

There are four major reasons why the affirmative duty should be eliminated.
Part A of this section will discuss how the affirmative duty places various burdens on
the general public. This subsection will also demonstrate not only the difficulties
that alleged infringers face in court, but also the economic dilemmas faced by those
researchers and developers trying to compete in the market. Part B will establish
that because a mere failure to act with due care does not constitute "egregious" or
"reprehensible" conduct, an award of enhanced damages for such a failure runs
contrary to the Due Process Clause and is inconsistent with Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding punitive damages. Part C will show that at common law
there are specific requirements for the imposition of a duty of care, which the Federal
Circuit has failed to satisfy in creating the affirmative duty of due care in patent law.
Finally, Part D will demonstrate that the affirmative duty, as a consideration in
determining liability for willful infringement, is an excessive and unnecessary means
for the protection of the rights of patent owners.

76 To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 29 ("Panelists expressed considerable
dissatisfaction with a state of affairs that in effect exposes firms to greater potential damages for
trying to learn if they are infringing any patents than if they keep themselves blissfully ignorant.").
77 See Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The test is whether..
.a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court might hold
the patent invalid or not infringed."). This case is an example of the ambiguity of the duty of care.
See id.
78 To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 30 ("[F]ear of willfulness charges works to
undermine the patent system's disclosure goals by discouraging third parties from reading
patents.").
The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of designing around and further
expanding and improving upon existing patents:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the
general public.... such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the
high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which.. will stimulate
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); Powers, supra note 13, at 96.
79 See TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 30.
80 See id. at Executive Summary, 2 (discussing that the "quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility").
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A. The Affirmative Duty Places Too Heavy a Burden on the GeneralPublic and Has
Negative Effects on the Efficiency of TechnologicalAdvancement
One of the major problems with the affirmative duty is that it "turns the
traditional burden for demonstrating willfulness on its head."8 1 The former law
required the patent owner to prove willful infringement.8 2 Now the patent owner
simply has to prove notice of the patent and the burden shifts to the alleged
infringer, who must negate the presence of willful conduct.8 3 This burden shifting
84
implicates to jurors that the defendant is guilty until he proves himself innocent.
Although the rule no longer strictly requires disclosure of legal advice in order to
prevail, the burden of negating willful infringement will remain difficult without an
85
opinion of counsel.
The uncertainty in the law has created much apprehension in the research and
development sectors of the economy.8 6 With the number of patent law suits tripling
in the past twenty years, individuals and corporations cannot help but to be
concerned about liability.8 7 With the added threat that looking at another's patent
may constitute notice and expose them to willfulness charges, many inventors keep
their distance from existing patents.88
Inventors are expressing "considerable
dissatisfaction with a state of affairs that in effect exposes firms to greater potential
damages for trying to learn if they are infringing any patents than if they keep
themselves blissfully ignorant."89 In essence, the fear of willfulness charges is
81 Amicus Brief Securities, supra note 67, at 10.

This amicus brief advocated for the

elimination of the affirmative duty. Id. at 11. The burden for demonstrating willfulness has
traditionally been placed on the patent owner. Id. at 10.
82 Id.

at 10.

Id. Shifting the burden to the alleged infringer cuts against the general rule requiring clear
and convincing evidence of willful misconduct for imposition of punitive damages. fd.; Taylor, supra
note 21, at 729-30.
84 Taylor, supra note 21, at 726 ("In fact, our present approach is closer to assuming willfulness
than the presumption of innocence afforded a criminal defendant.").
85 Amicus BriefBiotech, supra note 67, at 6 ("With complex, evolving, uncertain, and disputed
doctrines of patent law as the predicate for gauging the state of mind, it has become difficult to know
what lengths to go to secure enough advice so that in hindsight it will assuredly look to have been
competent."). Because of the vagueness as to what constitutes notice and what conduct satisfies due
care, potential infringers will be uncertain whether their conduct adheres to the duty of care and
whether they have received notice triggering the duty in the first place. See id. It is obvious that
this uncertainty creates problems for the defendant in proving that his conduct was proper. See id.
Many potential infringers will feel that they have no choice but to obtain an opinion of counsel in
order to negate any possible future finding of willfulness. Calderone, supra note 18, at 5.
86 See Thronson, supra note 62, at 2 (The authors discussed the FTC Report, which "found that
the willful infringement doctrine has few defenders." Some of the individuals at the hearings stated
that "the doctrine has an in terrorem effect that is out of proportion to its beneficial effects.").
87 To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 24 ("patent litigation . . . has increased
greatly in recent years, tripling between 1981 and 2000"). Not only are the amount of law suits
excessive, but the costs of litigation are extremely exorbitant. Kenneth S. Weitzman, How to Avoid
Patent Infringement Litigation, MD NEWS, at http://www.morganfinnegan.com/articles/MDM04.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2004). "It is reported that the average cost of a patent litigation in the U.S.
exceeds $2 million." Id.
88 This "see-no-evil" philosophy is an attempt to avoid having prior knowledge of competitor
patents. Thronson, supra note 62, at 2. According to the current law, there may be no willful
infringement where the alleged infringer was not aware of the other's patent. Id.
8) TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch.5, at 29.
83
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undermining the goals of the patent system by inhibiting the dissemination of new
ideas.90
Once notice has been established, firms will most likely seek legal advice in
order to show due care and overcome any future willfulness charges. 91 This is not a
simple process and is often an extremely expensive endeavor. A patent opinion from
outside counsel will generally cost around $20,000, and can exceed $100,000 where
the opinion involves a complex patent. 92 In addition to the burdensome costs, it is
also a time consuming process that distracts employees from their normal course of
business. 93 This costly and time consuming defense is simply not an option for
individual inventors and small companies.9 4 The affirmative duty therefore imposes
extreme and unnecessary financial burdens on large companies and creates an
injustice for small companies and individuals that cannot afford to obtain an opinion
of counsel. 95 It is necessary to eliminate the affirmative duty in order to remove the
apprehensions and financial burdens associated with the threat of willfulness
liability.

B. The Affirmative Duty is Ineonsistent with Supreme CourtJurisprudence
RegardingPunitive Damages and Runs Contraryto the Due Proeess Clause
A mere failure to act according to a standard of care does not constitute the
reprehensible conduct required at common law for the enhancement of damages. 96 In
fact, a failure to satisfy a duty of care is squared more closely with common law
definitions of negligence than it is with concepts of egregious and reprehensible

90 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 737. ("As matters now stand many companies discourage

employees from reading patents .. .this defeats the basic purpose of the patent laws, dissemination
of information.").
91 Calderone, supra note 18, at 5 (2004). Although no longer required by law to negate
willfulness, the opinion letter remains the most assured way to defend against claims of willful
infringement. Id. Until the courts better define conduct that satisfies the duty of due care, firms
will most likely obtain opinions to be safe. [d.
92 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 740; Powers, supra note 13, at 102 ("patent opinions generally
cost at least $20,000, and frequently cost over $100,000"); Amicus BriefSecurities, supra note 67, at

9.
93 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 740. The estimated costs of $20,000 to over $100,000 do not
include the "internal costs to the company involved in communicating with employees to get
information on products or processes, time spent reviewing the patent by corporate officers, and
delays induced in projects due to possible infringement issues." Id.
94 See Amicus Brief Public, supra note 68, at 7 ("Upon receiving notice of an existing patent,
the only practical options for most small entities are to cease their activities or to continue them
while risking treble damages."). It is a safe assumption to say that most individual inventors and
small companies would not be able to afford $100,000 plus external costs and time expenditures any
time they thought they might be infringing another's patent. Soo id.
9
See id. In discussing the financial burden on small entities this brief explains that
"[p]urchasing an opinion of counsel or negotiating and paying for a license normally will be
infeasible. Because treble damages would be financially crippling, many legitimate activities will be
improperly chilled." Id.
9 Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Dyk stated that "a potential
infringer's mere failure to engage in due care is not itself reprehensible conduct." Id.
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conduct. 97 "Negligence has often been defined as the failure to take precautions that
cost less than the damage wrought by the [harm]."98 This seems to precisely define a

defendant's conduct where he fails to adhere to the duty of taking sufficient
precautions to make sure that his conduct did not infringe another's patent rights. 99

The following hypothetical may help to illustrate this point: A store owner
notices that a container of milk has been spilled creating a potentially slippery and
dangerous situation for his customers.100 Having knowledge of the potentially
damaging situation, the store owner has a duty to act with care to make sure his
customers are not injured.10 1 Similarly, in patent law, when an inventor becomes
aware that he might be infringing another's patent rights, he has knowledge of a
potentially damaging situation and has a duty to act with care to make sure the
patent owner is not injured. In the above store owner scenario, if a customer slipped
and fell, the store owner's failure to clean up the mess would still not justify punitive
damages no matter how badly the customer was injured. "Conduct that is merely
negligent, even if it causes severe damage, is insufficient to justify punitive
damages."10 2 The defendant's failure to conform his conduct to an affirmative duty of
due care comports more closely with common law negligence than with common law
97 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 2000). The BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition
for the term negligence is: "The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation." Id. It can be argued that the affirmative duty is
just a standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a situation when
he has been put on notice that his conduct may infringe another's patent. See id. This is just a
manifestation of negligence in patent infringement and does not in any way designate willful or
intentional conduct, which are more culpable mental states warranting punitive damages. See id.
98 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 447 (1993); see also United States. v. Caroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) (discussing that a duty of care is a function of three
variables: (1) the probability of injury; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions).
99 See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 447. When Judge Dyk in Knorr-Bremse stated that "a potential
infringer's failure to engage in due care is not itself reprehensible conduct," he did not elaborate or
give reasons why it does not constitute reprehensible conduct, but only stated that to do so shifts the
burden of proof. Knorr-Bremse,383 F.3d at 1349 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
After taking a look at the law of neglignen, it becomes clear that the failure to engage in due care
cannot constitute reprehensible conduct because at the most it merely represents negligent conduct.
See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 447.
100 This is a classic negligence scenario involving a duty of care. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 256 (Colo. 1983). The traditional elements required for a cause of action in
negligence are: (1) a duty to use reasonable care, (2) a breach of the duty, (3) a reasonable causal
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury, and (4) damages resulting to the interests
of another. Hall v. Arthur, 141 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1998). In this hypothetical, there may be
exceptions as to whether the store owner owes the person slipping a duty, but for purposes of this
example let it be assumed that the store owner does owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent injury to the hypothetical patron. Safeway 658 P.2d at 256-257.
101 Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 208 Mass. 273, 274 (1911). Actually, the law would not
require the store owner to have knowledge of the spill, but rather that the spill was on the floor for
such a considerable period of time that an employee of the store owner or the store owner himself
would have seen and removed the mess if they had been reasonably careful in performing their duty.
Id. However, it could be argued that this is, in effect, "constructive knowledge." See id.
102 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 553 (Robert C. Clark
et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000). It is even held that "grossly negligent" conduct does not justify punitive
damages when those terms are used to refer to "extreme carelessness." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979).
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concepts of willful behavior, and as such, an award of enhanced damages is
103
unwarranted.
Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions have limited the award of punitive
damages based on the Due Process Clause. 10 4 The Court in Gore stated that
"[perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." 10 5 In rejecting an
award of punitive damages the Court noted that the record was devoid of any "acts of
affirmative misconduct," or "deliberate false misstatements," or "concealment of
evidence of improper motive." 10 6 The current patent law is inconsistent with Gore
because liability under the duty of care stems from a failure to act, as opposed to
affirmative misconduct, deliberate false misstatements, or attempts at concealment.
The Supreme Court requirement of reprehensible conduct demonstrates that a
mere failure to act according to a duty of care is not a sufficient basis to award
punitive damages. 10 7 The patent law has developed, however, to allow a court to find
willful conduct where the alleged infringer has done no more than just that, failed to
adhere to the duty of care. 108 This application of willfulness unjustly allows the
award of punitive damages in cases involving good-faith or ignorant conduct.10 9 In
Seymour v. McCormick,110 while discussing the Patent Act of 1793, the Court
recognized the injustices of punishing a defendant for ignorant conduct:

10:3 See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1350 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Supreme Court cases interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 284 do not provide any basis for a duty of care. Id.
"Indeed, they appear to limit enhanced damages to cases of 'willful or bad-faith infringement."' Id.
Failure to conform to a duty constitutes no more than negligent behavior and definitely does not
constitute "willful or bad-faith infringement." See id.
104 Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
The court in Gore
begins the opinion with reference to the Fourteenth Amendment by stating that "The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive'
punishment on a tortfeasor." Id. Although the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits states from
violating due process, federal laws (and therefore patent laws) are equally prohibited from violating
due process through application of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person
shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law).
105 Gore, 517 U.S. at 575; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419
(2003). Campbell upheld the reasoning in Gore by affirming that the degree of reprehensibility is
the most important consideration in a determination of punitive damages. Id.
106 Gore, 517 U.S at 579. Similarly, punitive damages should not be warranted in patent law
cases for a potential infringer's failure to prove that he adhered to the affirmative duty of care,
where there exists no evidence of "deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or
concealment of evidence of improper motive." See id.
107 Id. at 562. It can therefore be argued that the affirmative duty in patent law violates the
Due Process Clause because it allows for the imposition of a "grossly excessive" punishment on a
tortfeasor. See id. Enhancement of damages for a failure to act with due care would be "grossly
excessive" in the sense that the punishment does not fit the crime, for the culpability of such a
failure does not rise up to the level of reprehensible conduct. See id.
108 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
10) See Powers, supra note 13, at 99. Parties that independently develop their own technology
without relying on the patents of others can be held liable for willful infringement. Id. Once the
independent inventor receives notice of his possible infringement, he has an affirmative duty to
determine whether or not he is infringing. Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389. Failure to act with due
care may result in liability for willful infringement. Id.
110 Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1854).
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The defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith.., was made liable
.. It is true,
where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive or
exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish the
defendant.1 11
to the same penalty with the wanton and malicious pirate .

Seymour is consistent with the 150 years of precedent that had been strictly
followed prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit. 112 Prior to the 1980's, judges
only awarded enhanced damages in unusual cases, typically involving egregious
conduct. 113 The affirmative duty clearly contradicts this precedent. 114 The law needs
to return to its former interpretation, which involved no affirmative duty and more
effectively achieved the goals of the patent system.

C. The Affirmative Duty of Carein the Patent Infringement Context Fails to Satisfy
Common Law Requirements for Imposition ofa Duty
Well established common law concepts regarding duty of care suggest that the
imposition of an affirmative duty on researchers and developers to make sure their
conduct avoids infringement is inappropriate. 115 Willful infringement incorporates
the defendant's state of mind as the primary element in determining liability. 116 In
determining a defendant's state of mind, courts have established that a failure to act
with due care once upon notice of the other's patent is a sufficient basis for a finding
of willfulness, and accordingly for enhancement of damages. 117 The duty of care in
the law of patent infringement runs contrary to the common law.
The common law holds that, in choosing whether to impose a duty of care, there
are important considerations that must be taken into account. 118 For instance, it is
important to evaluate and balance the conflicting interests of the respective
parties. 119 Factors to be considered are the risk of harm and the practicality of
preventing that harm. 120 Where it is relatively easy to correct the defendant's actions
111 Id.

at 488-89.

It is important to note that in this passage the court used the terms

'wanton" and "malicious" twice, stressing that the use of "vindictive" or "exemplary" damages is only

justified in situations involving serious misconduct. See id.
112 Beck, supra note 73, at 1.
1:3Id.
114 The fact that courts enforced the patent laws for over 100 years without an affirmative duty
of care is a strong argument that the affirmative duty is unnecessary for the effective enforcement of
patent rights.
11H5
The common law concepts referred to are generally applied in negligence cases. Since direct
patent infringement is a strict liability offense, it might be argued that this comparison is
inappropriate. However, a claim of willfulness considers the defendant's state of mind, and
therefore steps out of the bounds of strict liability. Therefore it is not unreasonable to compare
affirmative duty in willfulness claims to duty of care in negligence cases.
116 Taylor, supra note 21, at 748 (referring to statements made by commentator Richard
Rainey, in which Rainey points out that a determination of willfulness focuses mainly on the
infringer's state of mind). Id.
117 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
118 J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998).
119 Id. at 338.
120 Id. at 339.
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and the harm at risk is serious, it may be appropriate to impose a duty to act with
care. 121 Furthermore, the determination of whether to impose a duty of care should
also take into account notions of public policy, fairness, common sense, and
122
morality.
In implementing the affirmative duty of due care, the courts have not given
proper consideration to the appropriate factors. 123 Of utmost importance is the
balance of conflicting interests of the respective parties.1 24 On one side, the patent
owner has an interest in protecting his limited monopoly which he has rightfully
earned through public disclosure of his new and useful idea.1 25 On the other side,
there is the interest of the alleged infringer, which represents the interests of the
public and the need to advance technology by expanding upon already existing ideas,
including those of the patent owner. 126 It isdifficult to argue that the interests of the
1 27
patent owner outweigh the interests of inventors, researchers and developers.
This is especially true since the primary objective of the patent system is to benefit
the public, and any reward to the inventor is merely a means of achieving that end. 128
The affirmative duty also improperly favors patent owners by providing them a
windfall for enhanced damages. 129 The patent owner has the ability to protect his
patent by simply spending thirty-seven cents in postage to send a form letter to any
121

122

Id.at 339-40.
Id.at 339.

123 The precedent for imposing an affirmative duty begins with Coleman, in which the court
stated in dicta that the defendant did not act with due care. Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269
F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959). The court in Milgo picked up on this language and relied on it in
holding that the defendant had "an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether it
was infringing [plaintiffs] patents." Milgo Elecs. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, Inc., 623
F.2d 645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980). While establishing new precedent, the court does not justify its
imposition of such a duty. See id. At most, based on the facts of Milgo and Coleman, one could infer
that the cases suggest that the duty arises when there is clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has deliberately and purposefully copied the patented information. Powers, supra note
13, at 76. However, it seems highly unnecessary to impose a duty of care in a case where there is
already significant evidence of affirmative acts of purposeful copying. Id.
124 In patent law cases, it is extremely important to balance the interests of the parties. Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (referring to the "delicate balance" the law attempts
to maintain between patent holders and the public). In order to accomplish the goals of the patent
system to further innovation, it is essential that the law does not favor the interests of one party
over those of the other. See id.
125See To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 2. The patent owner's
rights must be protected so that his patent effectively excludes others, thus allowing him to reap the
benefits of a limited monopoly. See id. If the rights of patent owners to exclude others are
weakened, then inventors will have less incentive to share their ideas with the public through the
patent system. See id.
126 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). ("From their
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary
to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
127 To say so would be contrary to the overall purpose of the patent system-to benefit the
public. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
128 Id.("The promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward
of inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end.").
12) See Powers, supra note 13, at 101. (discussing an interview with Judge Mary Pat Thynge,
in which Judge Thynge stated that defendants do not often consider willful infringement in
settlement negotiations because they see this remedy as a "windfall for the patentee").
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competitor who, upon receipt, will be on notice of his possibly infringing activity. 130
This simple process sets the affirmative duty in motion. 131 It is entirely possible for a
company to receive hundreds of these allegations every year, requiring them to
expend substantial time, money, and resources into investigating patents that may
132
never be asserted.
Although the risk of harm to the patent owner is serious, it is not equally
convincing that the defendant's conduct can easily be prevented or corrected. 133 Due
to the uncertainty of the current law, it is difficult for a defendant to know when he
has been put on notice of the other's patent or whether his conduct fails to conform to
the affirmative duty of due care. 134 Researchers and developers are left with the
decision to expend significant time and money on excessive defensive policies,
investigating every single allegation in order to avoid liability, or to risk a possible
finding of willful infringement in court. 135 Although some may try to justify the
affirmative duty on grounds of the serious risk to the patent owner, the excessive
costs to defendants in attempting to avoid liability cuts against this
rationalization. 136
The affirmative duty also runs contrary to notions of public policy, fairness and
common sense. The correct public policy in patent law is to balance rights of a patent
owner with the rights of the public to research and develop in attempt to advance our
technology. 137 The affirmative duty violates notions of public policy and fairness by

1:30 See Amicus BriefSecurities, supra note 67, at 5 ("In what has become colloquially known as
the '37 cent notice' problem, patent holders can set in motion a very costly process for alleged
infringers merely by sending a letter.").
1:31Id.
132 DeMasi, supra note 5, at 2.
In addition to patents that employees of companies encounter in the course of
their work, companies may receive hundreds of allegations of patent infringement
annually . . . Despite a company's best efforts to identify those patents or
allegations that are most credible, it is still forced to spend substantial resources
in employee time and legal fees investigating patents that may never be asserted.
Id.
133 In all practicality, it is conceded that in today's competitive market patent owners face
significant risks of having their patent rights infringed. Free market competition however, is
essential to a thriving economy, and where research and development firms face the constant threat
of infringement liability, it is necessary to have rules that more clearly define the rights of a patent
owner. Because of the ambiguity of the affirmative duty research and development firms are
constantly left guessing as to whether their conduct might result in liability.
134 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 735. What is necessary to put a potential infringer on notice is
far from clear. Id.; see also id. at 737 ("Two commentators recently suggested that the Federal

Circuit has indicated an infringer can have notice of a patent merely by reading about its issuance
in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE."). That notice can be found where a potential infringer reads about the
issuance of a patent in a publication seems like a strained interpretation of case law. Id. The only
thing that is certain is that the Federal Circuit has not clearly defined what constitutes notice. See
id. It seems that the courts prefer to decide on a case-by-case basis. Soo id.
1:35 Id. at 740. The law leaves potential infringers wondering whether they have avoided notice
and whether their conduct has satisfied the affirmative duty. Id. This uncertainty in turn creates
economic inefficiency. -d.
136 Although we must protect the rights of patent owners, we must not do so in a way that puts
an unreasonable economic burden on the public. Soo Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,

489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
137

Id.

[4:509 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

tipping the balance too far in favor of patent owners. 138 Policy and fairness mandate
that we return the parties of a patent infringement suit to an equal playing field by
removing the affirmative duty.

D. What the Affirmative Duty Purportsto Achieve Can Be Accomplished in Its
Absence
Although the affirmative duty accomplishes its purpose of protecting the rights
of patent owners, it does so only while inflicting a serious inconvenience on
information sharing. 139 In addition, the duty adds too much confusion to an already
complex area of law. 140 To put things in perspective it may help to compare and
contrast patent rights to tangible property rights. 141 One of the amicus briefs made
an important observation:
A chain link fence, with .

.

. posted "No Trespassing" signs along the

perimeter defines precisely the metes and bounds of a parcel of real
property. When the perimeter of protected rights is well defined and their
validity self-evident, a duty of due care to avoid willful trespass . . . may
indeed legitimately vindicate private property interests. Patents ... are not
surrounded by "bright line" perimeters and certain vailidity. Applying a
"duty of due care" to such inherently uncertain, unpredictable, shifting
14 2
patent property perimeters is particularly problematic.
A patent uses words to define an idea and identify the scope or "perimeters" of
the invention that is claimed. 143 It has been said that an inventor may become his
138 See To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 29. Fear of liability for willfulness is
discouraging inventors from reading patents, thereby undermining the purpose of the patent
system. Id.; see Thronson, supra note 62, at 2. The article discusses the FTC report which found
that the willfulness doctrine has few defenders. Id. One person reportedly said, "I simply didn't
look at any patents ... and if anybody mentioned a patent I burned it as quickly as possible." id.
This shows that the affirmative duty has detrimental effects on public policy. See id.
139 The negative effect of the affirmative duty on the distribution of information is an extremely
important consideration. In discussing the importance of circulating patent information to the
public, the Supreme Court has stated that "additions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of [20]
years of exclusive use for its disclosure." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
11 See Amicus BriefSecurities,supra note 67, at 5 ("As the uncertainty increases, it becomes
more difficult - and more costly - for a company to evaluate whether it has a good-faith basis to
practice a claimed technology.").
MI Although some similarities may exist between tangible property rights and intellectual
property rights, it is the distinctions between them that are important and that warrant a different
treatment with respect to policies involving exemplary damages.
112 See Amicus BriefBiotech, supranote 67, at 12.
143 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). The specification of a patent contains both a written description of
the invention and one or more claims describing the scope of the subject matter being claimed as the
invention. Id. The written description consists of the "enablement" and "best mode." Id. The
enablement refers to the terms which would describe the invention in a way to allow a person
having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention, whereas the best mode describes the
best way of carrying out the invention. Id. In patent infringement suits, the claims are the most
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own lexicographer and bring to light new words (or new ways to use existing words)
in order to define his invention. 144 There is an inherent difficulty and uncertainty
associated with using words, which depend greatly upon interpretation, to describe a
completely new idea. 145 An alleged infringer should not be punished for his incorrect
"interpretation" of the words that define the "perimeters" of another's patent. 146 A
duty of care cannot work effectively where an actor is uncertain whether his conduct
is violating the rights of another.
There are various threats facing an alleged patent infringer designed to protect
a patent owner.1 47 In fact, it has been suggested that the threat of willful
infringement provides superfluous protection to the rights of the patent owner. 148 An
1 49
accusation of infringement is often aimed at the heart of a company's technology.
Perhaps the most serious threat isthe possibility of injunctive
relief, which would
require a party to shut down their infringing activity.1 50 Where a company has
devoted significant time, money and resources into the development, production and
sale of a particular product, an injunction requiring them to cease that activity could
deal a serious economic blow to the company. This powerful deterrent has been
described as the "hammer" relied on by patent owners in settlement negotiations to
compel alleged infringers to purchase a license.1 51 Although removal of the
affirmative duty may reduce the threat of willful infringement, the lingering threat
of permanent injunction will continue to deter infringing activity.
Furthermore, because a finding of willful infringement requires consideration of
the "totality of the circumstances," elimination of the affirmative duty only removes

relevant because they define "the subject matter which the [patent owner] regards as his invention."

Id.
144

See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).

Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence
of a thing in a patent application .... [The] conversion of machine to words
allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the
invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not
always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake
of words, but words for things.
Id.; see Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (referring to
the fact that a patentee may act as his or her own "lexicographer" in order to set forth an explicit
definition of a term different from its ordinary meaning).
H5 Festo, 535 U.S. at 731.
146 Clearly, a patent owner should be compensated for innocent and good-faith infringements,
but should not be awarded enhanced damages in these instances.
117See Powers, supra note 13, at 100 (including injunctive relief, actual monetary damages,
and attorney fees).
148

Id. at 101.

19 See Exculpatory Opinions,supra note 18, at 1 (C[T]he threat is often leveled at a company's
core technology, changes to which are never trivial").
150 Id. ("[P]atent infringement carries with it the very real threat of devastating injunctive
relief').
151 See Powers, supra note 13, at 100-101. In an interview, Judge Mary Pat Thynge discussed
what she has observed in settlement negotiations to be the most serious deterrent to patent
infringement. Id. at 100. She said that she believed the threat of permanent injunction has the
most serious effect on settlement negotiations and that the threat of willful infringement was
relatively insignificant in this context. Id. In this discussion, Judge Mary Pat Thynge referred to
the threat of permanent injunction as the "hammer" in settlement negotiations. Id.
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one factor from the determination. 152 It can be argued that, in cases that developed
the affirmative duty, the purposeful and deliberate copying of another's patent is so
apparent that consideration of the infringer's adherence to a duty is unnecessary to
find liability. 153 For instance, purposeful copying was apparent in Coleman Co. v.
Holly Mfg. Co., which was the first case to mention a duty of care.1

54

In this case,

Coleman continued sales of an infringing product after the issuance of a previous
court ordered injunction.1 55 Coleman added a useless part to its infringing product in
attempt to disguise its obvious willful conduct.1 56 Although the court stated that
Coleman failed to act with due care, this was an unnecessary understatement
because the evidence of purposeful infringement was readily apparent.1 57 In
addition, General Electric Co. v. Skiaky Bros., Inc. implied the existence of an
affirmative duty.1 58 According to the trial court, the evidence demonstrated that
General Electric had pirated Skiaky's patents once it realized it could not develop a
superior product. 159
Moreover, in Milgo, the case officially establishing the
affirmative duty, the trial court found evidence that the patent had been "faithfully
160
copied" and that the infringement was not "merely accidental or negligent."
It is apparent from these decisions that evidence from the patent owner tending
to show malicious, purposeful, or deliberate copying or pirating of another's patent
should be sufficient to establish willful liability. In fact, recent case law has
established that behavior such as purposeful copying, concealment of infringement,
or infringement intended to injure a competitor is sufficient for a finding of willful
infringement.1 61 Evidence of purposeful and deliberate conduct was clear in the cases
discussed above, and therefore the use of the affirmative duty was unnecessary for a
determination of willful infringement. Because the affirmative duty is unnecessary
and excessive in deterring infringement and it adds too much confusion to the
complexity of patent law, it accordingly should be eliminated.

III. PROPOSAL
There are various ways to go about solving the problems with the current law of
willfulness doctrine.
For instance, one of the amicus briefs in Knorr-Bremse
advocated for a less strict application of the affirmative duty.1 62 The amicus brief by
152 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (The second factor,
although not explicitly referring to the "affirmative duty," describes the alleged infringer's duty to

form a good-faith belief that his conduct did not constitute infringement.).
153 See Powers, supra note 13, at 76 (suggesting that the affirmative duty "grew out of cases
where the trial court found that the defendant had intentionally copied the patented technology").
154 Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959).
155 Id. at 661-63.
150;Id. at 665.
157 Id. at 666 (The court found that the defendant had "faithfully copied" the device, and that
such copying revealed an intentional disregard of the patentee's rights.).
158 Gen. Elec. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (6th Cir. 1969).
159 Id. at 1072.
100 Milgo Elecs. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980).
161 See Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1348-49 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162

See Amicus Brief Public, supra note 68, at 1.
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Public Knowledge requested that the application of the duty to act with due care
depend on the quality of actual notice received by the alleged infringer. 163 Another
solution is to require additional evidence to substantiate bad-faith intent to
infringe. 164 Although these options would alleviate some of the burden on research
and development, such solutions ignore the fact that the affirmative duty, causes too
much uncertainty and confusion, is inconsistent with common law principles and
gives patent owners the upper hand in patent litigation. Accordingly, the most
effective solution to the problem is elimination of the affirmative duty.
Along with being burdensome and inconsistent with the law, the affirmative
duty is also unnecessary and excessive in achieving what it purports to accomplish.
The affirmative duty is the hair-pin trigger on willful infringement analysis in
court. 165 When this lethal weapon is pointed at the alleged infringer, the affirmative
duty makes the threat of willful liability all the more serious. This added threat,
however, is unnecessary to enforce the rights of patent owners because willful
' 166
liability depends on other considerations within the "totality of the circumstances."
Removal of the affirmative duty will not change the threat of willful infringement,
but taking out this hair-pin trigger will eliminate the unpredictability of
punishment. 167 Furthermore, it is understood that a permanent injunction forcing
the infringer to cease and desist its infringing activity is the most serious threat in
patent infringement cases. 168 The threats involved in patent infringement litigation
are sufficient enough to deter purposeful and deliberate infringement of another's
inventions. 169 It is unjust to punish an individual for his good-faith interpretation of
another's patent, especially when there are sufficiently available means for
170
punishing only those who act knowingly and maliciously.

10 3

Id,

161 See Taylor, supra note 21, at 741 (proposing to amend the second paragraph of section 284

to give the court authority to enhance damages only after finding "clear and convincing evidence of
willful infringement" as well as "literal infringement").
165 Although it is often claimed that the duty of care is one factor to be considered in the willful
infringement analysis, a look at the jury instruction tends to demonstrate just how easily a failure to
act with due care can result in a jury finding of willful infringement. Soo, e.g. Hoechst Celanese
Corp. v. BP Chemicals, 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The following instruction was read to
the jury in Hoechst v. BP Chems.: "You may find that BP and Sterling willfully infringed the '806
patent if you find, by clear and convincing evidence, that BP and Sterling failed to exercise due care
to determine whether or not they were infringing the patent, after they had actual notice of the
patent.' Id. This instruction gives to the jury everything they need to make a finding of willful
infringement with nothing more than a conclusion that the alleged infringer failed to act with care.

Id.

166 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
167 Unpredictability of whether or not damages will be trebled is what makes designing around
patents such a dangerous endeavor. If the law were more certain, inventors would not have to
worry that their good-faith conduct in attempting to improve upon existing patents might result in
liability for willful infringement.
168 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
170 In many of the cases applying the affirmative duty, there was already sufficient evidence of
purposeful or deliberate copying. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom Mcan Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,
1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In this case, the alleged infringer actually admitted to deliberately
copying the patent. Id. In holding that the defendant willfully infringed, the court stated that "the
law imposes an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of
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Accordingly, elimination of the affirmative duty is the only solution that will
effectively remove the undue burdens on society while curing the inconsistencies in
the law. With removal of the affirmative duty, the burden of proof for establishing
willful conduct will shift back to the patent owner, who will once again be required to
prove that the defendant purposefully and deliberately infringed his patent rights.
Inventors will be able to go about designing around patents without fear of excessive
liability. Inventors will still proceed with respect for the rights of patent owners,
knowing that they will be punished for any purposeful infringements. Patent owners
can rest assured that, while enhanced damages might not be as readily available for
every infringement, they will remain accessible for situations in which the alleged
infringer's conduct is proved to be reprehensible. Certainty will return to the law of
patent infringement, allowing companies to proceed based on the good-faith
assertions of their in-house patent counsel and to cut back on some of their excessive
costly defensive policies.

IV. CONCLUSION

The patent system contemplates that an inventor should be rewarded for his
contribution of a new and useful idea to society. 171 As a reward, the inventor is given
a limited monopoly which allows him to exclude others from his intellectual property
for a period of twenty years. 172 In order to encourage inventors to disclose their ideas
to the public, it is important to vigorously enforce the rights of patent owners. 173 It is
imperative, however, that while enforcing the rights of patent owners we also
consider the interests of society in the continual advancement and development of
technology. 174 While affording patent owners diminutive protection will discourage
public disclosure of inventions, affording them excessive protection will discourage
inventors from building upon existing patents, which will result in the suppression of
innovation. 175

another." Id. In this case, as in other cases, there were sufficient means for establishing willful
infringement without relying on the affirmative duty.
17, See To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 2.
172 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
173 The court in Knorr-Bremse suggests that application of the duty to act with due care in
patent law is necessary to vigorously protect and reinforce the rights of patent owners. See
Knorr-Bremse Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("Fundamental to determination of willful infringement is the duty to act in accordance with law.
Reinforcement of this duty was a foundation of the Federal Circuit court, at a time when widespread
disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovation incentive.").
174 The court in Knorr-B±romsehas claimed that prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit,
disregard for patent rights was "widespread." Id. While this is a good reason to develop policy
restoring protection of patent rights, it is important to remember that only deliberate and malicious
behavior should be targeted with the willful infringement doctrine. See id.
175 Using the affirmative duty for the purpose of deterring purposeful and deliberate
infringement in patent law is analogous to surrounding banks with landmines in an attempt to keep
away robbers. While effectively frightening away any possible wrongdoers, it simultaneously keeps
away the innocent users that benefit society.
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It is apparent that, for the past twenty years, the Federal Circuit has provided
excessive protection to patent owners. 76 The crucial balance of the rights of patent
owners and the interests of the public has been thrown askew with the introduction
of the affirmative duty in patent law. The Federal Circuit has shown its willingness
to reset the balance with its decision in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate the adverse
inference rule. 177

The law continues to favor patent owners, however, and the

removal of the adverse inference rule did not greatly rectify this situation. 178 The
problems with the affirmative duty are clear. Therefore, in order to return harmony
to the essential balance between respect for the rights of the patent owner and the
necessity for the public to design around existing patents, it is most beneficial to view
the affirmative duty as "a relic of the past and eliminate it as a factor in the
179
willfulness and enhancement analysis."

176 See Powers, supra note 13, at 55 ("In the past twenty years . . . courts have extended the
reach of the treble damages provision to permit an award of increased damages against infringers
who independently developed their own technology.").
177 See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
178 What the removal of the adverse inference rule did effectively accomplish was that it
returned the sanctity to the attorney-client privilege. Since, the Federal Circuit in Knorr-B±romso,
however, did not provide any insight as to what conduct will suffice to meet the duty of care in the
absence of an opinion of counsel, the uncertainty in the law will continue to adversely affect
technological advancement. See Stephen C. Durant & Gene H. Yee, An Analysis ofKnorr-Bremse,
THE INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Nov. 11, 2004, at 3 ("[U]ntil the Federal Circuit provides guidance
as to what conduct will suffice to meet the duty of due care in the absence of opinion of counsel,
there will be uncertainty as to what actions ultimately will be held sufficient to discharge that
duty.").
17') In his dissent in Knorr-Bremse, Judge Dyk finished his argument by stating, "I would
recognize that the due care requirement is a relic of the past and eliminate it as a factor in the
willfulness and enhancement analysis." Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1352 (Dyk, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Judge Dyk is correct because he realizes that the affirmative duty tilts
the scales in favor of the patent owner, and lays too heavy a burden on alleged infringers. See id. at
1349.

